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For many years three key aspects of creative processes have been glossed over by theorists
eager to avoid the mystery of consciousness and instead embrace an implicitly more formal,
computational vision: autonomy, phenomenality and the temporally embedded and bounded
nature of creative processes. In this paper we will discuss autopoiesis and creativity; an
alternative metaphor which we suggest offers new insight into these long overlooked aspects
of the creative processes in humans and the machine, and examine the metaphor in the
context of dance choreography.
1. Introduction
“And how will you enquire Socrates, into that which you know not?
What will you put forth as the subject of your enquiry? And if you find
what you want, how will you ever know that this was the thing that you
did not know?”, (Plato, ‘The Meno’, circa 380bc).
Although, perhaps surprisingly, the term ‘creativity’ has a relatively youthful etymol-
ogy - it was as recently as 1927 that Alfred North Whitehead first coined the term in his
Gifford lectures at the University of Edinburgh, (later published as ‘Process and Reality’
[30]), a term now so ubiquitous, that its recent origin is obscured - people have been
contemplating the process of creation for millennia: from Plato in ‘The Meno’ (ibid);
through 19th century and early twentieth century theorists whose accounts reified its
conscious, almost divine, nature (e.g. by Graham Wallas [29] who explicitly engaged
with its lived, phenomenological component; for Wallas ‘intimation’ is the feeling a cre-
ative person gets when a solution is on its way and ‘illumination’ the point at which the
creative idea bursts forth into conscious awareness); to the modern era where the compu-
tational zeitgeist has encouraged purely formal accounts, more amenable to mechanical
instantiation and explanations.
In contrast, in this paper we resist the computational turn and instead argue for a lived,
phenomenological account of creativity, predicated on a strong notion of the embedded,
embodied mind and enactivism [28]. An account that takes seriously the idea that creative
processes:
(1) have a conscious, phenomenal element - it feels like something ‘to create’ and ‘to
know’;
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Figure 1. Pina Bausch watching her young dancers parade in a new production of Kontakthof.
(2) are temporarily bounded;
(3) abound with notions such as, “embodied flow” “being in the zone” etc. which typ-
ically entail an altered mode of ‘being in the world’ - neither fully subjective or
objective: the potter at his wheel; the mathematician lost in her equations; the ten-
nis player enmeshed in a long, hard rally.
In this context we wish to rehabilitate older notions of creativity (such as that from
Wallas [ibid]) - which engage with the subjective (feeling of creation) and also invoke
another state of being (neither fully objective of subjective) - in a new enactivist account
delineated by Varela et al (ibid), in terms of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “entre-deux”:
“The world is inseparable from the subject, but a subject which is nothing but
a project of the world; and the subject is inseparable from the world but a world
which is nothing but a project of the subject’ ’.
In Figure (1) we see the iconic German dance choreographer, Pina Bausch, as she leads
40 teenagers, who have never heard of her or her work, into a new production of perhaps
her most minimalist Tanztheater, Kontakthof. How, given the times that she has staged
the piece since its inception 1978, did she succeed in bring-forth something new?
We believe that a clue to the answer may lie in the very processes Bausch used in
re-staging Kontakthof. Her work with the 40 teenagers was not merely a re-staging of
set choreography (which often means the dancer mimics, learns or copies, rather than
interprets1), but a more organic improvisational process, specific to Bauschs own cre-
ative process of re-staging around pre-existing choreography, for which interpretation
and learning of the movement gestures goes hand-in-hand.
1Although, of course, interpretation can be an emergent property of such action.
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2. Creativity in movement and dance
There are many ways to think about systems that choreograph movements that we so-
cially conceive of as dance. This theoretical work2 is inspired by Alfred North Whitehead’s
process view of organisation3 [30], viewed though the transformational conceptual-lens
of autopoietic theory (Maturana and Varela [19]); according to which we view a cre-
ative system as a clearly delineated and identifiable network of continuously operational
component producing processes and concomitant elements, bounded as an autonomous
entity within its own creative environment.
So construed, the autopoietic dancer can never be fully satisfied with her work, but con-
tinually re-engages a complex process of ‘attention’ (on her current movement context)
and ‘reconstitution’ (of her body), as she creatively reflects and enacts her world.
The autopoietic dancer lives in a universe of meaning-distinctions - the totality of
which constituting her dance-field - and her dance begins as creative processes are drawn
to, and collectively attend, these distinction(s); from which, at successive instants, she
chooses one element, the most ‘interesting’ gesture, to (re)interpret. In this manner the
autopoietic dancer continuously reflects and refracts back into the world she has just
brought forth, reinventing her universe in order that she may subsequently generate
further new (re)interpretations.
As interpretations disappear with their appearance, they cannot be altered, but only
give cause for the production of new movements, which are subject to the same mech-
anism. Thus, while there is a stimulating ‘dance-field’ with which to interact - and she
continues to (re)interpret interesting and meaningful gestures - this autopoietic unity will
continue intact. Conversely, as the dance-field becomes less stimulating, the meaning-
distinctions become less interesting and the autopoietic unity more-likely to fade and
ultimately dissolve; in the very moment of such movements coming into being, they
already fade away and the dancer returns to reflect stillness again4.
3. On ‘meaning distinctions’ and the ‘dance-field’
Central to the operation of the dancer’s autopoietic unity is the identification of inter-
esting meaning distinctions in the dance-field which, through her dance, she is able to
2This paper forms the left hand side of a diptych in which, herein, we offer autopoiesis as a new light under
which to view creative processes in richly embodied movement and dance; a philosophical exegesis of the core
generic concepts relating autopoiesis and creativity first discussed at AISB2016, Sheffield UK; cf. Bishop & Al-
Rifaie, Autopoiesis, creativity and Dance [8]. The original conceptual driver - relating swarm intelligence and
autopoiesis - first emerged in work by Al-Rifaie and Bishop [on swarmic sketching] and subsequent discussions
on computational art with Leymarie and Latham. Conversely, forming the right hand side of the diptych (and
working alongside Frederic Leymarie and William Latham) we instantiate the autopoietic metaphor of creativity
via a specific computational mechanism and successfully deploy this to improvise new computational sketches [3].
3For Whitehead, all real objects may be better understood as a constructed series of events and processes. It is this
core idea that Whitehead explains the seminal ‘Process and Reality’ [30], concluding that it is process, rather than
substance, that should be taken as the most fundamental metaphysical constituent of the world, “That ‘all things
flow’ is the first vague generalization which the unsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced.
Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory,
that experience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization
around which we must weave our philosophical system”, (ibid. pp. 317).
4.. in much the same way as Koskinen identifies that all business organisations eventually wither, dissolve away
and ultimately die “.. decisions have to be imagined as events. In the very moment of their coming into being,
they already fade away. Therefore, only little can be changed in business organizations. As decisions disappear
with their appearance, they cannot be altered, but only give cause for the production of new decisions, which are
subject to the same mechanism. And this is the reason why business organizations step by step wither and die”,
(K.U. Koskinen, ‘Why do Business Organizations die? Social Autopoietic Perspective’).
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(re)interpret.
3.1. Relationship to the Stanislavsky system
Under the gaze of the ‘autopoietic dancer’, we conceive of her dance-field as comprised
of ‘meaning distinctions’ emerging from the dancer’s umwelt5 of elements and gestures -
an open door; a movement of the head; the tension in a finger or arm; an inviting smile;
a light; a memory invoked; a shadow etc. - in this manner ‘meaning distinctions’ of most
interest to the dancer, neither fully subjective or objective in character, are brought-forth
through her choreographic interaction with the environment.
The totality of such ‘atomic’ meaning distinctions - delineating her sensorium, or field,
of movement embedded in sight, sound, touch and personal lived history - comprise
the artist’s dance-field. By modulating the distinctions she is drawn to attend, as she
creatively interacts with and explores her environment, the autopoietic dancer adapts
what she construes as [artistically] ‘meaningful’ in her own historical dialogue.
Furthermore, by analogy with what one scholar of Stanislavsky calls the ‘attention
field’ [10], the ‘dance-field’, so defined, has a strong resonance with core ideas from
Stanislavsky; as Ysabel Claire (ibid) observes:
“The arrangement of information in Stanislavskys inner world, then, is orientational, or
adpositional, because it is orientated in positional relationships to a source in a notional
three-dimensional space. In an adpositional model relationship is key. Therefore, in this
perceptual model, the circumstances of a persons life at any given moment (on-line) are
located perceptually in space, adpositionally: around the body. At any moment, we are
experiencing a particular configuration of available thoughts, memories, and feelings: I have
called this an attention-field. Patterns and consistencies within this field are apparent to
the observer as that information is leaked both verbally and non-verbally.”
3.2. Relationship to Dynamic Field Theory
In modern cognitive science Dynamic Field Theory outlines a important shift towards a
new and intentionally integrated theory of cognition. Thus, in their introduction to the
work of the DFT Research Group, as they move toward a unified theory of cognitive
dynamics, Spencer and Schoner suggest:
“ DFT provides an embodied account, that is, neural processes are grounded in sensory and
motor processes that are anchored on a body situated in a physical environment .. we are
pursuing a general theory that spans perception, action, and cognition .. carrying forward
a set of common principles as we move from lower- to higher-level cognition”, [25].
Furthermore, in [10] Clare grounds the cognitive dynamics of ‘Dynamic Field theory’
to the actor via the notion of ‘attention-field’ as follows:
“The Group outlines different types of ‘attention-fields’ - spatial attention-fields, scene
attention-fields, feature attention-fields, transformation attention-fields, contrast fields reti-
nal fields within which attentional foregrounding, hills and peaks of activation, and sequen-
tial transitions occur. Although these are short-term attention-fields, they can be related to
5As Clare[10] observes, “Jacob von Uexkull labelled perception of the world, experienced by and through the capacity
of species-specific bodies, the umwelt: literally surround-world. That is to say it is inherently embodied because it
is biologically limited by the sensory apparatus of the physical body”. Stanislavsky, developing a system of practice
for the actor, that was in opposition to purely representational modes of melodrama, offered one of the first modes
of training that, “... implicitly addresses this very subject, teaching the student to contextualize their individual
umwelt within a wider framework of the human umwelt: the spatial adpositional umwelt. This both frames the
acting process and opens the students awareness to what is humanly possible”, (ibid).
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the constructed attention-field of the actor, a long-term, artificially sustained field with a
complex contextual function .. Other relevant aspects of DFT include descriptions of work-
ing memory fields as feature, spatial, or scene .. In a chapter on Integrating perception-action
with cognition (pp. 197-226), Schneegans, Spencer, and Schoner address the attention-field
and working memory patterns of individuals in relation to objects in the real world - it
would be extremely useful to extend this to imagined objects and the conceptual world
within which actors function and construct the lives of their parts over time.”
4. On autopoiesis and allopoiesis
4.1. Autopoiesis or self-creation
Maturana and Varela’s original definition of autopoiesis is found in [19]:
“An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of pro-
cesses of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through
their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete
unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain
of its realization as such a network”, (p. 78).
Thus, the boundary of an autopoietic system is determined circularly by the production
of its constituent elements; in this way the organisation of, say, a cell is both ‘circular’ and
autopoietic because the components that specify the cell are the same components that
the organisation of the cell secures and maintains. It is this circularity that maintains the
cell as a living entity. It is in this sense that an autopoietic system can be considered as a
special type of homeostatic system, where the variable to be maintained and controlled is
the organisation and behaviour of the system. For Francisco Varela, autopoiesis is both
necessary and sufficient to characterise the organisation of living, autonomous systems.
In addition to maintaining the conditions for its own continued existence, an autopoi-
etic system may, in addition, generate allopoietic system(s) as output(s).
4.2. Allopoiesis
In contrast to autopoiesis, the operation of an allopoietic system is given in terms of
the concatenation of processes. Such processes are not the processes that specify the
components of the system itself, as a unity; instead the components are produced by
other processes that are independent of the organisation of the system. Because the
components that make up an allopoietic system’s existence are contingent upon other
systems, an allopoietic system is never ‘fully autonomous’. Some examples of allopoietic
systems are: cars, trains, robots etc.
Furthermore, because an allopoietic system is always contingent on the output of other
systems for it existence, its teleology and meaning will always reside in the observers
world, never in its own - the systems - world.
4.3. On the autopoietic status of systems
To determine whether a system is or is not autopoietic in its organization, Varela et
al. [27] have developed six key points or criteria that should be applied to the system;
Koskinen [15] restates these criteria as follows:
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(1) Determine, through interactions, if the unity has identifiable boundaries. If the
boundaries can be determined, proceed to 2. If not, the entity is indescribable and
we can say nothing.
(2) Determine if there are constitutive elements of the unity, that is, components of the
unity. If these components can be described, proceed to 3. If not, the unity is an
un-analyzable whole and therefore not an autopoietic system.
(3) Determine if the unity is a mechanistic system, that is, if the component properties
are capable of satisfying certain relations that determine the unity, the interactions,
and transformations of these components. If this is the case, proceed to 4. If not, the
unity is not an autopoietic system.
(4) Determine if the components that constitute the boundaries of the unity consti-
tute these boundaries through preferential neighbourhood relations and interactions
between themselves, as determined by their properties in the space of their interac-
tions. If this is not the case, you do not have an autopoietic unity because you are
determining its boundaries, not the unity itself. If 4 is the case, however, proceed to
5.
(5) Determine if the components of the boundaries of the unity are produced by the
interactions of the components of the unity, either by transformation of previously
produced components, or by transformations and/ or coupling of non-component
elements that enter the unity through its boundaries. If not, you do not have an
autopoietic unity; if yes, proceed to 6.
(6) If all the other components of the unity are also produced by the interactions of
its components as in 5, and if those which are not produced by the interactions of
other components participate as necessary permanent constitutive components in
the production of other components, you have an autopoietic unity in the space in
which its components exist. If this is not the case and there are components in the
unity not produced by components of the unity as in 5, or if there are components
of the unity which do not participate in the production of other components, you do
not have an autopoietic unity.
Thus, the successful application of the above six-point taxonomy is sufficient to deter-
mine if a system is autopoietically organized (or not).
5. Luhmann: autopoeisis and social systems
In formulating his law of requisite variety William Ross Ashby [4] observed that to survive
in a complex environment while maintaining internal stability and structure, a system
must be able to generate an appropriate gamut of responses to an ever changing environ-
ment. In contrast, General Systems Theory, as formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy [6],
assumes an open systems model6, viewing complex systems in terms of the difference be-
tween ‘the system and its environment’; contra a closed system model7 and mereological
distinctions between, say, the physical instantiation of ‘whole and parts’.
Influenced by General Systems Theory, the core element of Niklas Luhmann’s ‘system
theoretic’ view of social systems is communication: social systems are systems of com-
munication and society is the most encompassing social system. In Luhmann’s view [17]
a social system is defined by the boundary between itself and its environment, which is
considered an infinitely complex (‘chaotic’) exterior. Thus, relative to the exterior, the
6An open system exchanges material, energy, people, capital, information etc. with its environment.
7A closed system does not allow transfers in or out of the system.
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interior of the social system is a space of reduced complexity: communication within a
social system operates by selecting only a limited element of all the information available
outside the system. In this way Luhmann’s concept of communication inherently entails
a “reduction of complexity”, whereby the criteria according to which information is se-
lected and processed is meaning. Thus social systems are operationally closed because,
while they use and rely on resources from their environment, those resources do not
become an integral part of the systems’ operation.
Thus for Luhmann, social systems operate by processing meaning and furthermore,
each system has a distinctive identity; a unity, that is constantly reproduced in its com-
munication and depends on what is considered meaningful (and what is not) for that
system. If the system fails to maintain this identity, it dies, it ceases to exist and it
dissolves back into the wider environmental ether whence it came.
Luhmann conceived this process of continuous reproduction from elements previously
filtered from an over-complex environment as autopoiesis8.
5.1. Social cognition and autopoietic enactivism
Furthermore, by demonstrating how consciousness and subjective experience are related
to the brain and body of an organism in enactivist theory, Evan Thompson [26] binds
the notion of autopoiesis to consciousness - not just cognition.
“... our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities
to interact with the world. Organisms do not passively receive information from
their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Nat-
ural cognitive systems .. participate in the generation of meaning ... by engaging
in transformational, and not merely informational, interactions; they enact a
world.”
In this light, and following Luhmann, Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo [13]
have extended the enactive concept of ‘sense-making’ [26] into the cultural domain,
whereby De Jaegher and Di Paolo argue that the interaction process itself can take on
a form of autonomy (operationally [autopoietically] defined). This allows us to consider
autopoiesis in creativity as the generation of meaning and its transformation through
individuals interacting [within a dance-field].
6. ‘Creativity’ as an autopoietic process
6.1. Historical
The resonance of art with autpoiesis has been explored by several thinkers, most notably
Luhmann who in his theory of social systems [18] famously put forward a ‘theory of
art’ as “a particular system of communication”, i.e. “.. the function of art can be traced
to problems of meaningful communication” [16]. For Luhmann, the domain of art is
to be viewed as an operationally closed and self-referential communicative system, an
autopoietic system; radically suggesting that it is “.. from the autopoiesis of art which
8NB. Both Varela and Maturana have forcefully argued against this appropriation of the term autopoiesis; in
Maturana and Varela’s conception, people cannot be proper elements of a social system’s renewal because (a)
in describing social systems as operationally closed networks of communications, Luhmann ignores the fact that
communications presuppose human communicators [21] and (b) people are not (re)produced as an integral and
core part of a social system’s renewal processes [22].
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works of art will be created”. This led Rampley, in his review [24], to suggest that the
“.. key question Luhmann addresses [in his conception of art and autopoiesis] is how art
differentiates itself from other systems”.
A traditional, representation-heavy, view of the artist as an open-system, fundamen-
tally posits the artist’s activities as contingent on external influences; the artist responds
creatively to demands from a pre-given, objective environment by building and creatively
processing appropriate internal representations. In this view, through his art, the artist
builds representations of a pre-given reality - universal, objective, and transferable - and
it is his role, as artist, to transform these representations in novel, interesting and creative
ways.
The contrary, autopoietic perspective reflects that creativity is autonomous and oper-
ationally closed9. In addition, autopoietic creative systems stand ‘structurally coupled’
with their medium; fundamentally embedded in a dynamic of changes, exercised via
appropriate sense-action coupling. This continuous dynamic can be considered a rudi-
mentary form of creative knowledge.
Emerging from a General System Theory perspective, the exploration of autopoiesis in
the context of ‘creativity studies’ was first outlined by Gornev in 1997 [12] who first set
out to construct a theory of human creativity on the foundation of autopoietic systems
theory (AST), whereby:
“creativity is seen as an activity recurrently reproduced by couplings of specific states of
moderate emotional arousal with transitional environments, i.e. soft social structures in
which the world is permitted to be both subjective and objective; the archetype of these
creative couplings can be found in the earliest perfect environment formed by the symbiotic
infant/mother relationship”.
In contrast in 2010 Takashi Iba [14] defined “Creative Systems Theory” in order to
view creative processes10 in an alternative way, “.. focusing the process itself without the
reference to psychic or social aspects”. In his work Iba postulated creative processes to
be “autopoietic systems whose elements are ‘discoveries’ emerged by a synthesis of three
selections: idea, association, and consequence”.
However, by merely defining that “creativity is an autopoietic system whose element
is discovery”, Iba’s work, like Gornev’s first tentative explorations thirteen years earlier,
remains floating very much at a conceptual level; it offers little insight into how ‘creative
process’ at the personal, ‘psychic’, artistic level could ever actually be cached out; indeed,
as he stated in the paper (ibid), this was never his project.
6.2. Our view
Conversely, and in an analogous manner to Luhmann’s conception of information pro-
cessing, we view creativity as entailing a reduction in complexity of meaning in the
environment; with the system operationally closed because, while its creativity uses and
relies upon resources from its environment, these resources do not become part of the
underlying systems’ operation.
Viewed under this conception, a creative system (a) processes meaning and (b) main-
tains a distinctive identity; a unity that is repeatedly reproduced in its operation, con-
9It is operationally close in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the unity of creation
and that, while they use (and rely upon) resources from their environment, those resources do not themselves
become an integral core element of the creative systems’ operation.
10Iba defines that a creative process consists of “a sequence of discoveries, which include problem finding, problem
solving, observation, hypothesis formation, method selection, practice, and interpretation”, (ibid).
8
December 6, 2016 Connection Science AutopoiesisCreativityDance2
tingent upon what is considered meaningful (or not) for the system. If the environmental
conditions are such that, over time, the creative system can no longer maintain this
identity, then its investigations will simply dissolve away to void.
In this way creativity is a constructive process; it inherently reflects an individually
constructed artistic reality. Furthermore, because autopoietic creativity emerges from the
observation of distinctions and not of things, its operation is fundamentally contingent
on its own history, and in this way is ever-sensitive to its own historical context.
In summary, and in contrast to the classical view of creative processes building (reflect-
ing on and transforming) representations of a pre-given, out-there, world, an autopoietic
view of creativity is based on the simultaneous knowledge processes of sensing and mem-
ory. In this context memory11 entails that:
• the unity has access to its existing knowledge;
• previous, accumulated, knowledge modulates the the unity’s ongoing structures and
operations;
• the unity’s cognitive structures and operation affect its acquisition of new data from
the environment and its creation of new internal knowledge structures.
Furthermore, we observe that by conceptualising creative processes within an autopoi-
etic framework, we must conclude that creativity is never a directly transferable skill or
knowledge12.
7. Autopoiesis, creativity and dance
In our work we examine a dancer, typically working with a rehearsal director, a choreogra-
pher, who guides the dancer’s movements. We consider the space defined by the dancer’s
state-of-mind, the dancer’s movements and teacher’s movements as the dance-field13. The
continual creative processes of attention and reconstitution (movement) mechanisms that
act in this field are detailed in the accompanying paper (in the context of ‘the Autopoietic
Artist’ - a ‘weakly creative’ computational drawing system) [3].
We see in Figure (2) Jo, one of the rehearsal Directors of this production of Kontakthof,
working with one of the students, and draw the reader’s attention to three observations
from the scene:
(1) From her expression it is apparent that the dancer is both deeply engaged and acutely
feeling the creative process.
(2) There appears to be a diminution of the dancer’s subjective self, as her concentration
and bodily-control bring-forth a deeply engaged coupling between her actions, the
choreographer’s intent and her environment.
(3) The precariousness and temporal boundedness of the creative act. Eventually in
the rehearsal, we see the dancer’s coupling dissipate as she returns to her normal,
subjective, self-critical state: a ‘being in time’.
11A self-referential process which facilitates access to, and learning from, previous experiences and knowledge [15].
12Cf. Koskinen on ‘autopoietic knowledge systems in project-based companies’ [ibid]
13Mathematically imagined represented as a complex manifold.
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Figure 2. Image of young dancer in Kontakthof as she listens to feedback from Jo, one the rehearsal Directors.
8. The autopoietic dancer as a ‘strongly’ creative system
We view the creative, guided-improvisations of the ‘autopoietic’ dancer as being primar-
ily directed by two functionally distinct processes: (i) a process of attention whereby the
dancers ‘cognitive resources’ are drawn to (potentially multiple) elements of meaning-
distinction in the dance-field that are in some sense important to the dancer (in [3] we
suggest this could be computationally realised by stochastic diffusion processes [7]; see
Appendix (A)) and (ii) a process of interpretation whereby a movement is (re) interpreted
by the dancer in her performance (a process which in [3] we suggest could be computa-
tionally realised by a ‘particle swarm’; see Appendix (B)). Elements of the dance-field
that are most meaningful/important to the dancer (at this particular instant in time)
will attract the most cognitive resources, resulting in these elements to be attended to
next by the (re)interpretation processes controlling the dancer’s movement(s).
NB. It is a natural consequence of considering the dancer’s control of her creative
movements as an autopoietic process defined in this way, that a skilled dancer/performer
will find some aspects of movement relatively simple (less interesting/meaningful) and
hence not deploy so much cognitive resources to their (re)interpretation as a dancer
relatively new to the movement; in this way the skilled dancer is thus free to redeploy
resources in more meaningful areas of performance, perhaps focussing on perfecting the
technicalities of a particularly difficult movement, or perhaps focussing on synthesising
her movements as a whole etc.
In this manner the ‘autopoietic’ dancer is thus continually engaged in a process of sens-
ing her environment (the dance-field) and reconstituting it (by iteratively first choosing
a gesture of meaning and (re)interpreting it); hence Varela et al’s criteria [27] for an
autopoietic entity are appropriately instantiated in the cognitive processes of the ‘au-
topoietic’ dancer acting in the space in which her creative unity exists.
Over time, with her ‘interest’ drawn to areas rich in meaning (peculiar to her), the au-
topoietic dancer, so construed, iteratively reinterprets meaningful-distinctions (gestures)
10
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Figure 3. Autopoiesis in creativity and dance.
in her current dance-field, so offering a very personal reinterpretation of the structure
of the work. Over time though, inevitably less of the dance-field will continue to offer
up meaningful-distinctions, at which point the dancer’s attention becomes gradually less
focussed as her creative process stultify and eventually cease; reifying the movements’
‘death’ and returning the dancer to silence. Thus, following Luhmann’s conception of
information processing, we view the working autopoietic dancer as inevitably entailing
a reduction in complexity, ravenously consuming ‘meaning-distinctions’ within her envi-
ronment (the dance-field) until none remain and movement ends ..
In this light (see Figure (3) the autopoietic model we suggest offers a new account
of creativity in terms of an operationally closed, casual circularity between three core
groups of elements:
(a) The creative-actor as a bounded system consisting of:
• the actor [dancer];
• an ‘attention-field’ [dance-field] comprised of a multitude of potential ‘meaningful-
distinctions’.
.. which generates ..
(b) A network of processes:
• neural processes that support attention;
• neural processes that support action.
.. which produces ..
(c) Components:
• ‘meaningful distinctions’ in the attention-field [dance-field];
• ‘meaningful actions’ in (and hence modification of) the attention-field [dance-field].
.. which [cyclically] update and together co-determine the bounded system ..
And we suggest that it is this - the dancer and her environment as a bounded
system, an autopoietic unity - that precariously brings forth the phenomenology of her
movement, alongside its inevitable dissipation ..
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9. Conclusion
In conclusion, in the context of Al-Rifaie and Bishop’s ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ taxonomy of
[computational] creativity [2], we suggest autopoiesis offers a new conception of ‘strong’
creativity’ in movement and dance. This new autopoietic, enactive conception offers
insights into (a) the phenonenality of the creative process - why it feels like something
to create; (b) the altered state of the creative process - in this context Merleau-Ponty’s
‘entre-deux’ conceptualises the state as being neither fully objective of subjective and
(c) the time-bounded period of creativity as the autopoietic creative processes inevitably
decays back to void. Furthermore, and in contrast to the computational autopoietic artist
[3], because the dancer’s biologically ‘strongly embodied’ [31] cognitive processes select
areas of meaning distinction that are, in her current context, paradigmatically meaningful
to her, the autopoietic dancer - richly embodied in her environment, the dance-field -
constitutes a fully autonomous strongly creative system.
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Appendix A. Stochastic Diffusion Search
This section introduces Stochastic Diffusion Search (SDS) [7] – a swarm intelligence al-
gorithm – whose performance is based on simple interaction of agents. This algorithm is
inspired by one species of ants, Leptothorax acervorum, where a ‘tandem calling’ mech-
anism (one-to-one communication) is used, the forager ant that finds the food location
recruits a single ant upon its return to the nest; therefore the location of the food is
physically publicised [23].
SDS is an efficient Swarm Intelligence global-search meta-heuristic [1], which we
deploy herein to search for ‘meaningful distinctions’ in the dance-field. The principles of
SDS can be most easily illustrated via analogy. Consider, ‘The Bar Game’:
A group of delegates attend a conference on computing and movement in
Thessaloniki and want to spend their evenings at the best bar in town; Thessa-
loniki, for those who are new to its charms, has a huge number of great bars and
each delegate will have their own taste defining what constitutes a good bar and
a good night out.
Initially, each delegate adopts a random hypothesis of the best bar in town
and visits that bar that night.
At the end of the evening each delegate merely needs to decide if they had a
good evening or not (a stochastic decision informed on a subjective assessment of
the bar and its clientele). I.e. Unless the bar is deemed ‘perfect’ by the delegate,
there is a non-zero probability that, over time, even a good bar may result in a
bad evening; nonetheless, across the population - ceteris paribus - delegates are
likely to keep returning to a ‘good’ bar ..
The next morning each delegate who didn’t like the bar they visited, asks
a randomly selected co-delegate, if they had a good time the previous evening;
if they did they simply adopt their fellow delegate’s hypothesis, otherwise they
simply reselect a new ’best-bar’ hypothesis at random.
It can be shown that over a relatively short period of time a stochastic dif-
fusion process (such as this) will converge, and a stable population of delegates
will assemble on the best bar in town ..
More formally, the SDS algorithm commences a search or optimisation by initialising
its population and then iterating through two phases (see Algorithm 1)
Algorithm 1 SDS Algorithm
01: Initialise agents
02: While (stopping condition is not met)
04: For each agent
03: Test hypothesis and determine activity
05: For each agent
06: Diffuse hypothesis
07: End While
In the test phase of each iteration, SDS checks whether the agent hypothesis is suc-
cessful or not by performing a hypothesis evaluation which returns a boolean value. In
the diffusion phase, contingent on the precise recruitment strategy employed, successful
hypotheses diffuse across the population and in this way information on potentially good
solutions spreads throughout the entire population of agents.
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Appendix B. Particle Swarm Optimisation
A PSO is a swarm intelligence optimisation process, whose broad principles of operation
we can illustrate with the following simple analogy:
Imagine that one dips a finger in a jar of honey and uses that honeyed-finger
to trace a line in the air in the presence of a swarm of bees. Fairly soon the
bees will begin to buzz around the honeyed finger tip. By using this swarm we
can generate a new series of points (defining a new line) simply by noting the
centroid of this swarm at successive instants in time.
More formally, a swarm in Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) algorithm comprises
of a number of particles and each particle represents a point in a multi-dimensional
problem space. Particles in the swarm explore the problem space searching for the optimal
position, which is defined by a fitness function.
Each particle has a position x, a velocity v, and a memory, p, containing the best
position found so far during the course of the optimisation, and this is called the personal
best (pbest). p can also be thought of as a particle ‘informer’. Particles participate in a
social information sharing network. Each particle is informed by its neighbours within
this network, and in particular, the best position so far found in the neighbourhood,
is termed the neighbourhood best. The position of each particle is dependent on the
particle’s own experience and those of its neighbours.
The standard PSO algorithm defines the position of each particle by adding a velocity

















where w is the inertia weight whose optimal value is problem dependent [11]; ~vt−1id is the
velocity component of particle i in dimension d at time step t − 1; c1,2 are the learning
factors (also referred to as acceleration constants) for personal best and neighbourhood
best respectively (they are constant); r1,2 are random numbers adding stochasticity to the
algorithm and they are drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval U (0, 1); pid
is the personal best position of particle xi in dimension d; and gid is the neighbourhood
best. Therefore, PSO optimisation is based on particles’ individual experience and their
social interaction with other particles. After position and velocity updates, the positions
of the particles are evaluated and the memories p are updated, if a better position has
been found.
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